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Abstract 
The question of whether free will actually exists has been debated in philosophy for 
centuries. However, how belief in free will shapes the perception of our social environment 
still remains open. Here we investigate whether belief in free will affects how much 
intentionality we attribute to other people. Study 1a and 1b demonstrate a weak positive 
relation between the strength of belief in free will and the perceived intentionality of soccer 
players committing handball. This pattern even holds for behavior that is objectively not 
intentional (i.e., when the player touches the ball accidentally). Going one step further, in 
Study 2 we find a weak correlation between belief in free will and perceiving intentions in 
very abstract geometrical shapes. These findings suggest that whether individuals believe 
in free will or not changes the way they interpret others’ behavior, which may have 
important societal consequences. 
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That goal was scored a little bit by the hand of God and another bit by Maradona’s head. 
(Diego Armando Maradona) 
 
Thanks to Diego Armando Maradona, Argentina’s World Cup quarter-final against 
England in 1986 became one of the most famous games in soccer history. In the 51st 
minute, Maradona entered the penalty area, rose and punched the ball with his hand past 
England’s onrushing goalkeeper. None of the officials spotted this misbehavior, letting 
Argentina finish the match with a victory. Confronted with TV replays clearly establishing 
that he had scored the goal with his hand, Maradona defended his behavior by claiming that 
it had not been himself but the hand of god that had scored the goal, indicating that he did 
not have intentional control over his own behavior. So, did Maradona actually commit 
handball intentionally or did he not? In the present article, we argue that the answer to this 
question depends on how much people believe in free will. More specifically, we argue that 
the more individuals believe in free will, the more they attribute intentionality to the 
behavior of others. 
Free will is a cornerstone of our society and most people believe that they have free 
will (Baumeister, Masicampo, & DeWall, 2009; Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, & Turner, 
2005). However, the question of whether free will actually exists or not is a long-standing 
philosophical debate (Dennett, 2015; Van Inwagen, 1983). Within the last decades, 
(cognitive) neuroscientists started entering the debate (cf. Crick, 1994; Harris, 2012; 
Wegner, 2002). One of the most well-known experiments on this topic was conducted by 
Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl (1983). During this experiment, neural activity in the 
brain was measured with electroencephalography (EEG) before and after participants made 
spontaneous and voluntary finger movements. In addition, participants indicated the time 
when they perceived their first urge to initiate a movement. The researchers found an 
increase in neural activity several hundred milliseconds before participants reported being 
aware of an urge to initiate a movement. Although this and similar findings have been used 
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to suggest that free will does not exist (Libet et al., 1983; Libet, Wright, & Gleason, 1993), 
the link between such findings and free will is actually less clear (Saigle, Dubljević, & 
Racine, 2018). Nevertheless, many media articles reported that Libet et al.’s experiments 
speak in favor of the nonexistence of free will despite acknowledging that several 
methodological limitations had been identified in the literature (Racine, Nguyen, Saigle, & 
Dubljevic, 2017). Since anti free-will viewpoints became popular in the media, researchers 
started investigating whether it matters if people believe in free will by testing 
psychological and social consequences of free will beliefs (e.g., Baumeister, 2008; Ewusi-
Boisvert & Racine, 2018; Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017; Rigoni & Brass, 2014; Rigoni 
& Brass, 2015; Schooler, Nadelhoffer, Nahmias, & Vohs, 2014; Shariff et al., 2014; Vohs 
& Schooler, 2008). 
Such psychological research demonstrated that believing in free will has several 
downstream consequences. For instance, it has been found that people who believe in free 
will perform better in self-control tasks (Rigoni, Kühn, Gaudino, Sartori, & Brass, 2012), 
but also in a variety of other contexts, such as in work (Stillman et al., 2010) and academic 
settings (Feldman, Chandrashekar, & Wong, 2016). Moreover, free will beliefs predict 
higher job satisfaction (Feldman, Farh, & Wong, 2018). When weakening individuals’ 
belief in free will, researchers found increased antisocial behavior, such as cheating 
(Martin, Rigoni, & Vohs, 2017; Vohs & Schooler, 2008), racism (Zhao, Liu, Zhang, Shi, & 
Huang, 2014), and aggressiveness towards others (Baumeister et al., 2009), as well as 
decreased prosocial attitudes expressed in altruistic (Baumeister et al., 2009) and 
cooperative behavior (Protzko, Ouimette, & Schooler, 2015).  
Neuroscience and cognitive research suggest that such behavioral changes 
stemming from reduced free will beliefs may be linked to a degradation of neural and 
cognitive mechanisms underlying intentional action preparation (Rigoni, Kühn, Sartori, & 
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Brass, 2011), deliberate motor inhibition (Lynn, Van Dessel, & Brass, 2013; Rigoni et al., 
2012), or the processing of performance errors (Rigoni, Pourtois, & Brass, 2015; Rigoni, 
Wilquin, Brass, & Burle, 2013).  
Yet, an open and more basic question is whether and how belief in free will affects 
the perception of others’ behavior. Perceiving and interpreting the behavior of others is one 
of the most critical tasks people face in everyday social life (e.g., Heider, 1958; Jones, 
1979). People constantly judge and categorize others in an automatic fashion (e.g., Bruner, 
1957; Fodor, 1983; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977), and this largely determines how we 
eventually interact with them (Harris & Garris, 2008; Kenny, 1994; Macrae & 
Bodenhausen, 2000). Thereby, perceiving the intentionality of a certain behavior may 
shape the way individuals interact with each other (e.g., Genschow, Bardi, & Brass, 2018; 
Genschow & Brass, 2015). Indeed, perceiving the intentionality of others’ behavior is one 
of the most fundamental tasks in our society as it is the basis for many important decisions. 
In the legal system, for example, punishment strongly depends on the degree to which a 
person acted intentionally. Likewise, in sports, disciplinary punishments by referees often 
depend on how intentional a player’s behavior was. The most prominent example in this 
respect is probably handball in soccer, because punishment for such a misbehavior depends 
on whether the player intentionally touched the ball with the hand or arm (Federation 
Internationale de Football Association, 2015).  
Taken together, past research has demonstrated that believing in free will increases 
perceived intentional control of one’s own actions (Aarts & van den Bos, 2011; Lynn et al., 
2014; Rigoni et al., 2012). As people use their own representations to understand and 
predict other people’s behavior (e.g., Gallese & Goldman, 1998), it is reasonable to assume 
that the more individuals believe in free will, the more they perceive not only their own 
actions, but also others’ actions as intentionally driven. First support for this reasoning 
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comes from research showing that belief in free will decreases people’s tolerance for 
unethical behavior (Clark et al., 2014; Shariff & Vohs, 2014) and increases participants’ 
tendency to punish (Shariff et al., 2014; Martin, Rigoni, & Vohs, 2017; Genschow, Rigoni, 
& Brass, 2017) or to reward others (Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017). In the present 
article, we argue that such effects may stem from an increased perception of intentionality.  
Overview of Research 
In order to test the hypothesis that belief in free will is related to perceiving other 
people’s behavior as intentionally driven, we conducted three studies. In Study 1a and 1b 
we measured participants’ belief in free will, showed participants video clips of soccer 
players committing handball and asked them to indicate how intentional the players’ action 
was. In Study 2 we tested whether belief in free will is not only related to perceived 
intentionality of concrete and real-live actions, but also applies to the perceived 
intentionality of moving abstract geometric shapes. All studies were conducted according 
to the ethical rules presented in the General Ethical Protocol of the Faculty of Psychology 
and Educational Sciences at Ghent University. At the beginning of each study, participants 
provided informed consent of the study and were informed that participation was voluntary 
and that all answers were processed and stored anonymously. The data of all studies and 
the German translation of  the Free Will Inventory (FWI; Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, 
Sripada, & Ross, 2014) are made open accessible at the Open Science Framework (OSF; 
https://osf.io/q6bt2/).  
Study 1a 
Method 
Participants. We recruited German speaking participants online via Facebook by 
advertising our study in groups that are interested in participating in psychological studies. 
A total of 108 participants (38.9% female) with ages ranging from 14 to 90 (M = 29.86, SD 
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= 12.35) agreed to voluntarily participate in the study.   
Procedure. Participants participated online in our study. They first saw 10 different 
video clips. In each video clip a soccer player committed handball within the penalty area. 
The video clips were taken from a video-based online training tool (Schweizer, Plessner, 
Kahlert, & Brand, 2011) that is used for improving soccer referees’ decisions. All handball 
actions committed within the videos had previously been pre-rated by a professional referee 
expert panel. In 5 videos, the soccer players intentionally touched the ball with their arm or 
hand. In the other five videos, the players accidentally touched the ball with their arm or 
hand. In order to prevent that participants might know the teams within the videos, we 
chose games that had taken place in lower German leagues. Moreover, we placed a black 
bar over the videos so participants could not see the current score, the elapsed time in the 
game and the name of the teams. Participants were allowed to watch each video multiple 
times. To measure perceived intentionality, participants indicated for each video their 
agreement on a 7-point rating scale (1 = strongly disagree; 4 = neither; 7 = strongly agree) 
for the statement “The player touched the ball with his hand/arm intentionally”. To prepare 
the data for analysis we computed three scores. First, we calculated an overall score of 
perceived intentionality by averaging the indicated intentionality of all videos. Second, we 
calculated a mean score of perceived intentionality for videos in which the players 
intentionally touched the ball with their arm/hand. Third, we computed a mean score of 
perceived intentionality for videos in which the players accidentally touched the ball with 
their arm/hand. After rating the videos, participants filled in the German version (see 
https://osf.io/q6bt2/) of  the Free Will Inventory (FWI; Nadelhoffer, Shepard, Nahmias, 
Sripada, & Ross, 2014) to assess participants’ belief in free will. The FWI includes 15 
items measuring the strength of belief in free will (Cronbach’s α = .59), determinism 
(Cronbach’s α = .76) and dualism (Cronbach’s α = .75) on 7-point rating scales. To 
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compute an overall score of the scale we computed the mean of the free will, dualism and 
reversed determinism subscale.  
 
BELIEF IN FREE WILL AND PERCEIVED INTENTIONALITY   9 
Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Screenshots of all videos used in Study 1a and 1b divided into handball committed accidentally 
versus intentionally. Red circles highlight the handball incident. Note, the red circles were not implemented in 
the actual study. 
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At the end, participants indicated basic demographics and were debriefed (i.e., they 
read additional information about our general hypotheses).  
Results 
In order to test our hypothesis that belief in free will is positively correlated with 
perceived intentionality we ran multiple correlation analyses. First, we correlated the 
overall score of perceived intentionality with all FWI subscales (i.e., free will, dualism, and 
determinism) as well as the FWI overall score. The analysis indicated that the belief in free 
will subscale was positively correlated with the overall score of perceived intentionality, r 
= .23, p = .015, CI [0.05, 0.42]. Further correlational analyses indicated that neither 
dualism (r = .14, p = .145), nor determinism (r = .16, p = .109), nor the FWI overall score 
(r = .11, p = .281) was correlated with the overall score of perceived intentionality. 
In an additional analysis, we ran a multiple regression analysis with all the FWI 
subscales as predictors and the overall score of perceived intentionality as the dependent 
variable. When entering the dualism and determinism subscale into the regression equation, 
belief in free will remained significant in predicting perceived intentionality, b  = .20, t = 
2.01, p = .047, CI [0.003, 0.38]. 
In a final series of analyses we tested whether it matters if soccer players 
objectively committed handball intentionally or not. First, we tested whether participants 
perceived handball as more intentional within videos in which the players actually 
intentionally touched the ball with their arm or hand. A t-test for dependent samples 
indicated that participants indeed perceived handball as more intentional when  
players intentionally committed handball (M = 4.16, SD = 1.06) as compared to when 
players accidentally committed handball (M = 2.79, SD = 1.32), t(107) = 10.56, p < .001, 
CI [1.11, 1.62], dz = 1.02. Second, we tested whether belief in free will correlates with the 
two different forms of committing handball (i.e., intentional vs. accidental). Interestingly, 
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belief in free will subscale seems to correlate with perceived intentionality irrespective of 
whether the player actually committed handball intentionally, r = .21, p = .027, CI [0.03, 
0.40], or accidentally, r = .18, p = .062, CI [-0.01, 0.37].  
Study 1b 
Study 1a gives first support for our hypothesis that belief in free will is positively 
associated with perceiving intentionality in other persons’ behavior. However, one may 
argue that with 108 participants the study was slightly underpowered. Thus, in order to 
replicate the results obtained in Study 1a with a higher powered sample, we conducted a 
preregistered replication (study plan available at https://aspredicted.org/3j95s.pdf). 
Method 
Participants and Procedure. Participants were recruited via mailing lists of the 
University of Cologne (Germany). As compensation for their participation, subjects could 
participate in a lottery to win a 10 EURO Amazon voucher. Based on recommendations for 
the assessment of stable correlations put forward by Schönbrodt and Perugini (2013), we 
collected data from 250 participants (62% female). Ages ranged from 18 to 65 (M = 26.86, 
SD = 6.33).  
The procedure of the study was exactly the same as in Study 1a. In line with Study 
1a, we presented participants with 10 videos of soccer players committing handball and 
assessed participants’ belief in free will with the German translation (see 
https://osf.io/q6bt2/) of the FWI (Nadelhoffer et al., 2014). Cronbach’s Alpha was α = .69 
for the free will subscale, α = .72 for the determinism subscale and α = .74 for the dualism 
subscale.  
Results 
Preregistered analyses. The results of Study 1b replicate the results obtained in 
Study 1a (see Figure 1). That is, the belief in free will subscale was positively correlated 
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with the overall score of perceived intentionality, r = .21, p = .001, CI [0.09, 0.33]. The 
overall score of the FWI did not correlate significantly with the overall score of perceived 
intentionality, r = .10, p = .134. 
 
 
Figure 1. Plotted correlation between belief in free will and perceived intentionality in 
soccer players committing handball in Study 1b.  
 
 
Additional explorative analyses. In additional correlational analyses we found that 
determinism correlated with the overall score of perceived intentionality as well r = .18, p = 
.005, CI [0.05, 0.30]. Dualism was marginally significantly correlated with the overall 
score of perceived intentionality, r = .12, p = .065, CI [-0.01, 0.24]. In order to test whether 
belief in free will explains variance separately from the other subscales, we ran a multiple 
regression analysis with all the FWI subscales as predictors and the overall score of 
perceived intentionality as the dependent variable. When entering the dualism and 
determinism subscale into the regression equation, the belief in free will subscale remained 
significant in predicting perceived intentionality, b  = .17, t = 2.66, p = .008, CI [0.03, 
0.19]. 
In a final series of analyses we tested whether belief in free will is related to 
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perceived intentionality irrespective of whether the player actually touched the ball 
intentionally or accidentally. A first analysis indicated that participants perceived handball 
as more intentional when players intentionally committed handball (M = 3.98, SD = 0.79) 
as compared to when players accidentally committed handball (M = 3.11, SD = 0.98), 
t(249) = 12.26, p < .001, CI [0.72, 1.00], dz =.78. A second analysis indicated that the 
belief in free will subscale correlated with perceived intentionality irrespective of whether 
the players committed handball intentionally, r = .14, p = .023, CI [0.02, 0.27], or 
accidentally, r = .18, p = .004, CI [0.06, 0.31]. 
Discussion  
In Study 1a and 1b, we presented participants with video clips of soccer players 
committing handball and found first support for our general hypothesis: The more 
participants believed in free will, the more intent they perceived behind other people’s 
behavior1. Despite these results, there are a few issues that need to be addressed in order to 
draw strong conclusions. First, in Study 1a and 1b we assessed perceived intentionality by 
asking whether participants perceived the behavior as intentionally driven with one item 
only. Thus, it might be that individuals who believe in free will have the general tendency 
to agree with everything, which could explain the correlation with perceived intentionality. 
Second, the question arises as to whether our effects are specific to the domain of soccer, or 
whether they can be generalized to other behaviors as well. 
Third, in our first studies participants perceived behavior as intentionally driven 
even when the players objectively touched the ball with their hand or arm accidentally. 
																																																								
1 In an additional exploratory analysis we pooled the data from Study 1a and Study 1b and tested whether 
there is a gender difference in the correlation between perceived intentionality and belief in free will. This 
analysis indicates that the correlation between the belief in free will subscale and the overall score of 
perceived intentionality was similarly strong in female participants (rfemale = .24, p = .001, CI [0.11, 0.41]) as 
compared to male participants (rmale = .19, p = .019, CI [0.03, 0.32]). A comparison between the two 
correlation coefficients revealed that the two coefficients are not significantly different from each other, Z = 
0.49, p = .	31. 
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This may suggest that individuals who believe in free will perceive any kind of behavior as 
intentional. However, as the behavior in the soccer videos was embedded in a very rich 
social context, many secondary factors could have influenced participants’ perception. For 
example, the players from the other team usually protested and claimed a penalty even if 
handball was conducted accidentally. Moreover, the reaction of the fans or the reaction of 
the player committing handball may have influenced the perception as well. Based on such 
potential confounding variables, researchers often assess perceived intentionality by using 
stimuli that eliminate any low-level, animate-specific sensory cues. For example, 
researchers often use abstract stimuli such as animations of simple geometric shapes that 
avoid any veridical cues such as faces, eyes, or articulated joints (e.g., Castelli, Happé, 
Frith, & Frith, 2000; Martin & Weisberg, 2003).  
Thus, to rigorously test whether individuals who believe in free will infer intentions 
even in very abstract shapes and to control for possible low-level confounding variables, 
we conducted Study 2. Moreover, we assessed perceived intentionality with differently 
poled items to rule out that our effects are driven by participants’ general tendency to agree 
with everything. 
Study 2 
In order to test our predictions we conducted a high-powered and preregistered 
study (study plan available at https://aspredicted.org/b8sx7.pdf). 
Method 
Participants. Participants were invited online via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. In 
line with Study 1b and the recommendations put forward by Schönbrodt and Perugini 
(2013), we collected data from 250 participants (51,2 % female). Ages ranged from 19 to 
76 (M = 35.01, SD = 11.21).   
 Procedure. In order to measure participants’ perceived intentionality we presented 
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them with four video clips of moving geometrical shapes that were borrowed from Castelli 
et al. (2000). The characters in the videos were two triangles whose movement patterns 
evoke simple actions. Specifically, we selected videos in which abstract intentions could be 
inferred (i.e., dancing, chasing, fighting, leading). After watching each of the videos, 
participants indicated their agreement with the following two statements “The triangles 
behaved intentionally” and “The triangles moved randomly” on 7-point scales ranging from 
1 (applies not at all) to 7 (applies very much). In order to calculate a mean score of 
perceived intentionality, we averaged the rating of the first statement with the reversed 
coded rating of the second statement.  
After rating the videos, participants filled in the Free Will Inventory (FWI; 
Nadelhoffer et al., 2014) to assess participants’ belief in free will. Cronbach’s Alpha was α 
= .84 for the free will subscale, α = .85 for the determinism subscale and α = .87 for the 
dualism subscale. To achieve an overall score of the scale we computed the mean of the 
free will, dualism and reversed determinism subscale.  
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Table 2.  
Table 2. Screenshots of the videos used in Study 2. 
Results 
Preregistered analyses. To test our hypothesis that belief in free will is positively 
correlated with perceived intentionality of moving geometric shapes, we ran a correlational 
analysis. As hypothesized, the belief in free will subscale correlated positively with 
perceived intentionality, r = .15, p = .021, CI [0.22, 0.27]. Moreover, the overall score of 
the FWI correlated significantly with perceived intentionality as well, r = .20, p = .002, CI 
[0.07, 0.32]. 
Additional explorative analyses. Further analyses showed that determinism 
correlated negatively with perceived intentionality, r = -.19, p = .003, CI [-0.31, -0.06], and 
dualism did not correlate with perceived intentionality, r = .03, p = .592. 
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In an additional analysis, we computed a multiple regression analysis with all the 
FWI subscales as predictors and perceived intentionality as the dependent variable. In line 
with Studies 1a and 1b, the belief in free will subscale remained significant in predicting 
perceived intentionality when entering the dualism and determinism subscale into the 
regression equation, b  = .18, t = 2.59, p = .010, CI [0.04, 0.32]. 
General Discussion 
 In three studies, we tested the hypothesis that individuals who believe in free will 
perceive more intent behind other persons’ behavior than individuals who believe less in 
free will. In Study 1a and 1b we presented participants with videos of soccer players 
committing handball. Participants perceived the football players’ actions as more 
intentional the more they believed in free will. Interestingly, this effect even persisted when 
handball was committed accidentally and not intentionally. In line with this finding, Study 
2 demonstrated that participants who believe in free will even perceive more intentions in 
abstract geometrical shapes. This indicates that belief in free will is linked to a very basic 
and fundamental process underlying human social perception. Thus, we assume that even 
individuals believing in free will who are not familiar with soccer would perceive more 
intentions in soccer players committing handball. Future research may aim at testing this 
assumption more directly. 
In philosophy, there has been a debate surrounding the question of whether disbelief 
in free will might have detrimental (Smilansky, 2000) or beneficial (Pereboom, 2006) 
consequences for society. Our data provide empirical evidence that such debates are not 
merely theoretical but have highly relevant real-life implications. Moreover, our results 
provide a new perspective on past research on belief in free will. Previous research (e.g., 
Rigoni et al., 2011; 2012; 2013; 2015) has indicated that belief in free will increases the 
perceived intentionality of one’s own actions. In the present research, we demonstrated that 
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belief in free will increases perceived intentionality of others’ actions as well.  
Moreover, our research might have implications for research on punishment. That 
is, with a stronger belief in free will, people may punish other persons’ misbehavior more 
strongly, because they perceive behavior as more intentionally driven. Indeed, past research 
has shown that belief in free will decreases people’s tolerance for unethical behavior (Clark 
et al., 2014; Shariff & Vohs, 2014) and increases participants’ tendency to punish others 
(Shariff et al., 2014; Martin, Rigoni, & Vohs, 2017; Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017). 
Our research offers a potential explanation for these findings on a process level by 
suggesting that free will beliefs increase perceived intentionality. Going one step further, 
we would like to argue that perceiving others’ behavior as more intentionally driven should 
lead individuals to reward positive behavior more strongly. First support for this reasoning 
comes from recent research showing that the more people believe in free will, the more 
they reward positive behavior (Genschow, Rigoni, & Brass, 2017). The present findings 
suggest that this effect might be due to an increase in perceived intentionality.  
In addition, our results contribute to research on the fundamental attribution error 
(Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977) and the actor-observer bias (Jones & 
Nisbett, 1971; Nisbett, Caputo, Legant, & Marecek, 1973). Such research indicates that 
individuals have the tendency to perceive other people’s behavior as more strongly driven 
by internal forces (e.g., personality) and as less strongly driven by external factors (e.g., 
situation). Interestingly, we recently found that belief in free will increases the fundamental 
attribution error (Genschow et al., 2017)—that is, the more participants believed in free 
will, the more they perceived other people’s behavior as driven by internal, as compared to 
external forces. The present research offers a potential explanation for this finding: The 
more individuals believe in free will, the more intentions they perceive in others’ actions. 
Perceived intentions, in turn, may increase attributions to internal factors and decrease 
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attributions to external factors. 
Besides theoretical implications, our findings have important societal consequences. 
For instance, the results might be particularly relevant to court cases. Because in the legal 
system punishment strongly depends on the degree to which a person acted intentionally, 
our results suggest that free will beliefs may move judges and jurors toward harsher 
punishments. It is crucial to note that this logic is not restricted to court cases, but can be 
applied to any situation in which individuals judge others. For example, in educational 
settings, belief in free will should influence how intentional a behavior is perceived to be, 
which should lead teachers or parents to punish and reward children more strongly. 
Likewise, in sports, referees who believe in free will should perceive misbehavior as more 
intentionally driven, which may result in harsher penalty decisions.  
It is important to note that the findings reported here do not speak to the larger 
discussion on the existence of free will. In fact, it might well be that free will is nothing 
more than an illusion, but nevertheless offers some functionality. In contrast, it also seems 
possible to integrate a genuine sense of free will into scientific accounts of human behavior 
(e.g., Baumeister, 2008; Dennett, 2004; Kane, 1998; Shariff, Schooler, & Vohs, 2008). 
Although the question of whether free will exists or not remains open, our results 
demonstrate that the strength with which individuals believe in free will is of crucial 
relevance, because it influences how we perceive our social environment. 	  
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